Your last book:
You dont read books at this site.
Total books on site: 11 280
You can read and download its for free!
Hideyoshi
met this combination with his usual astuteness. He commissioned
Uesugi Kagekatsu to attack the Sasa troops in rear while Maeda
Toshiiye menaced them from the front; he told off Hachisuka to oppose
the soldier-monks of Kii; he posted Sengoku Hidehisa in Awaji to hold
in check the forces of Chosokabe Motochika, and he stationed Ukita
Hideiye at Okayama to provide against the contingency of hostility on
the part of the Mori family. Fighting commenced in the province of
Ise, and success at the outset crowned the arms of Hideyoshi's
generals. They captured two castles, and Ieyasu thereupon pushed his
van to an isolated hill called Komaki-yama, nearly equidistant from
the castles of Inu-yama and Kiyosu, in Owari, which he entrenched
strongly, and there awaited the onset of the Osaka army. The war thus
came to be known as that of Komaki.
Hideyoshi himself would have set out for the field on the 19th of
March, but he was obliged to postpone his departure for some days,
until Kuroda and Hachisuka had broken the offensive strength of the
monks of Kii. It thus fell out that he did not reach the province of
Owari until the 27th of March. His army is said to have numbered one
hundred and twenty thousand men. It is commonly alleged that this was
the only war between Ieyasu and Hideyoshi, and that the latter
suffered defeat at the hands of the former. But the fact is that two
of Hideyoshi's generals, Ikeda Nobuteru and Mori Nagayoshi, acted in
direct contravention of his orders, and thus precipitated a
catastrophe for which Hideyoshi cannot justly be held responsible.
These two captains argued that as Ieyasu had massed a large force at
Komaki and at the Obata entrenchments in the same district, he had
probably left his base in Mikawa comparatively undefended. They
proposed, therefore, to lead a force against Mikawa. Hideyoshi showed
great reluctance to sanction this movement, but he allowed himself to
be at last persuaded, with the explicit reservation that no success
obtained in Mikawa province should be followed up, and that whatever
the achievement of Nobukatsu's troops, they should at once rejoin the
main army in Owari.
Unquestionably Hideyoshi had in vivid recollection the disaster which
had overtaken Katsuiye at Shizugatake. Ieyasu, fully cognizant of the
situation through the medium of a spy, knew the limitations set by
Hideyoshi. On April the 7th, Nobuteru attacked the fortress of
Iwasaki, in Mikawa, killed its commandant, and captured the castle.
But elated by this victory, he neglected Hideyoshi's caution, and the
generals of Ieyasu, closing in on him, inflicted a crushing defeat at
a place called Nagakude. It is thus evident that Hideyoshi's share in
the disaster was of a most indirect character. He immediately
hastened to Nagakude, but only to find that Ieyasu had retired to
Obata, and subsequently, when Hideyoshi returned to his headquarters,
Ieyasu placed a still longer interval between the two armies by
marching back to Komaki.
The war thenceforth may be said to have consisted of a series of
menaces and evasions. Each general sought to entice his opponent out
of an entrenched position, and each general showed an equal
determination not to be so enticed. At last, Hideyoshi pushed a force
into Mino and captured several castles in that province. But even
this failed to change Ieyasu's attitude. The Tokugawa leader entered
the fortress of Kiyosu, and Nobukatsu repaired to that of Nagashima,
in Ise. After eight months of this comparatively fruitless
manoeuvring, a treaty was concluded, on December the 11th, between
Hideyoshi and Nobukatsu, and subsequently between Hideyoshi and
Ieyasu, the latter giving his son Ogimaru to be adopted by Hideyoshi.
The boy was eleven years of age at the time. His name was changed to
Hashiba Hideyasu, and he received the appointment of governor of
Mikawa province.
The circumstances in which this treaty was concluded have provoked
much historical discussion. Did the overtures come originally from
Hideyoshi, or did they emanate from Ieyasu and Nobukatsu? Some
annalists have endeavoured to prove that Hideyoshi assumed the
attitude of a suppliant, while others have attributed that demeanour
to the Tokugawa chieftain. The situation, however, presents one
feature which is very significant. It was not until the month of
November, 1584, that Chosokabe Motochika effectually brought the
island of Shikoku under his sway, and thus became free to lead a
strong army, including the monks of Kii province, against Osaka. This
formidable danger could not but influence Hideyoshi in the direction
of clasping hands with his eastern foes, and it is therefore more
than probable that a statesman who had never previously allowed
considerations of personal dignity to interfere with the prosecution
of a vital policy, did not hesitate to bow his head to Nobukatsu, in
order to recover the free use of the great army assembled in Owari,
Mino, and Ise. Most fortunate was it for Japan that events took this
turn, for, had Ieyasu and Hideyoshi remained mutually hostile, the
country would probably have been plunged into a repetition of the
terrible struggle from which nothing enabled it to emerge except the
combined labours of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu. It was not,
however, until the early summer of 1586 that Hideyoshi and Ieyasu
established genuinely friendly relations. During a year and a half
subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty which ended the Komaki
War, Ieyasu held severely aloof and refrained from visiting Kyoto.
Finally, Hideyoshi despatched Asano Nagamasa to propose that Ieyasu
should take into his household Hideyoshi's younger sister, and that
Hideyoshi should send his mother as a hostage to Okazaki, to remain
there during a visit by Ieyasu to Kyoto. Four months were needed by
Ieyasu to consider this proposal, and in September, 1586, he repaired
to Osaka and thence accompanied Hideyoshi to Kyoto.
HIDEYOSHI BECOMES REGENT
In May, 1583, after the downfall of Katsuiye, the Emperor appointed
Hideyoshi to be a councillor of State, and conferred on him the
fourth order of rank. In November of the following year, he received
another step of rank and was nominated gon-dainagon. The Emperor
Okimachi at that time contemplated abdication, but the palace which
he would have occupied as ex-Emperor had fallen into such a state of
disrepair as to be virtually uninhabitable. Hideyoshi signalized his
loyalty on this occasion by spending a large sum on the renovation of
the palace, and in recognition of his services the Emperor raised him
to the high post of nai-daijin. It was confidently expected that he
would then become sa-daijin, but, owing to complications which need
not be related here, the outcome of the matter was that he received
the still higher post of kwampaku (regent). There can be no doubt
that he himself had contemplated becoming shogun. In fact, it is on
record that he made proposals in that sense to Yoshiaki, the last of
the Ashikaga shoguns. But it had come by that time to be recognized
that only a scion of the Minamoto family could be eligible for the
post of shogun, and thus Yoshiaki declined Hideyoshi's overtures,
though to accept them would have materially altered the fallen
fortunes of the Ashikaga sept. Hideyoshi ultimately became prime
minister of State (dajo daijiri) and took the family name of
Toyotomi. It is stated, but the evidence is not conclusive, that in
order to reach these high posts, he had to be adopted into the house
of a Fujiwara noble. He had been a Taira when he served under
Nobunaga, and to become a Fujiwara for courtly purposes was not
likely to cause him much compunction.
THE MONKS, SHIKOKU, AND ETCHU
Immediately on the termination of the Komaki War, Hideyoshi took
steps to deal effectually with the three enemies by whom his
movements had been so much hampered, namely, the Buddhist priests of
Kii, the Chosokabe clan in Shikoku, and the Sasa in Etchu. It has
already been stated that the priests of Kii had their headquarters at
Negoro, where there stood the great monastery of Dai-Dembo-In,
belonging to the Shingon sect and enjoying almost the repute of
Koya-san. Scarcely less important was the monastery of Sawaga in the
same province. These two centres of religion had long been in
possession of large bodies of trained soldiers whose ranks were from
time to time swelled by the accession of wandering samurai (ronin).
The army despatched from Osaka in the spring of 1585 to deal with
these warlike monks speedily captured the two monasteries, and, for
purposes of intimidation, crucified a number of the leaders. For a
time, Koya-san itself was in danger, several of the fugitive monks
having taken refuge there. But finally Koya-san was spared in
consideration of surrendering estates yielding twenty-one thousand
koku of rice, which properties had been violently seized by the
monasteries in former years.
Three months later, Hideyoshi turned his arms against the Chosokabe
sept in Shikoku. This being an enterprise of large dimensions, he
entrusted its conduct to five of his most competent generals, namely,
Ukita Hideiye, Hachisuka Iemasa, Kuroda Nagamasa, Kikkawa Motoharu,
and Kohayakawa Takakage. Hideyoshi himself would have assumed the
direct command, and had actually set out for that purpose from Osaka,
when couriers met him with intelligence that less than one month's
fighting had brought the whole of the Island of the Four Provinces
into subjection. He therefore turned eastward, and entering Etchu,
directed the operations, in progress there under the command of Maeda
Toshiiye against Sasa Narimasa. This campaign lasted seven days, and
ended in the surrender of Narimasa, to whom Hideyoshi showed
remarkable clemency, inasmuch as he suffered him to remain in
possession of considerable estates in Etchu.
THE UESUGI
At this time Hideyoshi cemented relations of friendship with the
Uesugi family of Echigo, whose potentialities had always been a
subject of apprehension to Nobunaga. The powerful sept was then ruled
by Kagekatsu, nephew of the celebrated Kenshin.
met this combination with his usual astuteness. He commissioned
Uesugi Kagekatsu to attack the Sasa troops in rear while Maeda
Toshiiye menaced them from the front; he told off Hachisuka to oppose
the soldier-monks of Kii; he posted Sengoku Hidehisa in Awaji to hold
in check the forces of Chosokabe Motochika, and he stationed Ukita
Hideiye at Okayama to provide against the contingency of hostility on
the part of the Mori family. Fighting commenced in the province of
Ise, and success at the outset crowned the arms of Hideyoshi's
generals. They captured two castles, and Ieyasu thereupon pushed his
van to an isolated hill called Komaki-yama, nearly equidistant from
the castles of Inu-yama and Kiyosu, in Owari, which he entrenched
strongly, and there awaited the onset of the Osaka army. The war thus
came to be known as that of Komaki.
Hideyoshi himself would have set out for the field on the 19th of
March, but he was obliged to postpone his departure for some days,
until Kuroda and Hachisuka had broken the offensive strength of the
monks of Kii. It thus fell out that he did not reach the province of
Owari until the 27th of March. His army is said to have numbered one
hundred and twenty thousand men. It is commonly alleged that this was
the only war between Ieyasu and Hideyoshi, and that the latter
suffered defeat at the hands of the former. But the fact is that two
of Hideyoshi's generals, Ikeda Nobuteru and Mori Nagayoshi, acted in
direct contravention of his orders, and thus precipitated a
catastrophe for which Hideyoshi cannot justly be held responsible.
These two captains argued that as Ieyasu had massed a large force at
Komaki and at the Obata entrenchments in the same district, he had
probably left his base in Mikawa comparatively undefended. They
proposed, therefore, to lead a force against Mikawa. Hideyoshi showed
great reluctance to sanction this movement, but he allowed himself to
be at last persuaded, with the explicit reservation that no success
obtained in Mikawa province should be followed up, and that whatever
the achievement of Nobukatsu's troops, they should at once rejoin the
main army in Owari.
Unquestionably Hideyoshi had in vivid recollection the disaster which
had overtaken Katsuiye at Shizugatake. Ieyasu, fully cognizant of the
situation through the medium of a spy, knew the limitations set by
Hideyoshi. On April the 7th, Nobuteru attacked the fortress of
Iwasaki, in Mikawa, killed its commandant, and captured the castle.
But elated by this victory, he neglected Hideyoshi's caution, and the
generals of Ieyasu, closing in on him, inflicted a crushing defeat at
a place called Nagakude. It is thus evident that Hideyoshi's share in
the disaster was of a most indirect character. He immediately
hastened to Nagakude, but only to find that Ieyasu had retired to
Obata, and subsequently, when Hideyoshi returned to his headquarters,
Ieyasu placed a still longer interval between the two armies by
marching back to Komaki.
The war thenceforth may be said to have consisted of a series of
menaces and evasions. Each general sought to entice his opponent out
of an entrenched position, and each general showed an equal
determination not to be so enticed. At last, Hideyoshi pushed a force
into Mino and captured several castles in that province. But even
this failed to change Ieyasu's attitude. The Tokugawa leader entered
the fortress of Kiyosu, and Nobukatsu repaired to that of Nagashima,
in Ise. After eight months of this comparatively fruitless
manoeuvring, a treaty was concluded, on December the 11th, between
Hideyoshi and Nobukatsu, and subsequently between Hideyoshi and
Ieyasu, the latter giving his son Ogimaru to be adopted by Hideyoshi.
The boy was eleven years of age at the time. His name was changed to
Hashiba Hideyasu, and he received the appointment of governor of
Mikawa province.
The circumstances in which this treaty was concluded have provoked
much historical discussion. Did the overtures come originally from
Hideyoshi, or did they emanate from Ieyasu and Nobukatsu? Some
annalists have endeavoured to prove that Hideyoshi assumed the
attitude of a suppliant, while others have attributed that demeanour
to the Tokugawa chieftain. The situation, however, presents one
feature which is very significant. It was not until the month of
November, 1584, that Chosokabe Motochika effectually brought the
island of Shikoku under his sway, and thus became free to lead a
strong army, including the monks of Kii province, against Osaka. This
formidable danger could not but influence Hideyoshi in the direction
of clasping hands with his eastern foes, and it is therefore more
than probable that a statesman who had never previously allowed
considerations of personal dignity to interfere with the prosecution
of a vital policy, did not hesitate to bow his head to Nobukatsu, in
order to recover the free use of the great army assembled in Owari,
Mino, and Ise. Most fortunate was it for Japan that events took this
turn, for, had Ieyasu and Hideyoshi remained mutually hostile, the
country would probably have been plunged into a repetition of the
terrible struggle from which nothing enabled it to emerge except the
combined labours of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu. It was not,
however, until the early summer of 1586 that Hideyoshi and Ieyasu
established genuinely friendly relations. During a year and a half
subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty which ended the Komaki
War, Ieyasu held severely aloof and refrained from visiting Kyoto.
Finally, Hideyoshi despatched Asano Nagamasa to propose that Ieyasu
should take into his household Hideyoshi's younger sister, and that
Hideyoshi should send his mother as a hostage to Okazaki, to remain
there during a visit by Ieyasu to Kyoto. Four months were needed by
Ieyasu to consider this proposal, and in September, 1586, he repaired
to Osaka and thence accompanied Hideyoshi to Kyoto.
HIDEYOSHI BECOMES REGENT
In May, 1583, after the downfall of Katsuiye, the Emperor appointed
Hideyoshi to be a councillor of State, and conferred on him the
fourth order of rank. In November of the following year, he received
another step of rank and was nominated gon-dainagon. The Emperor
Okimachi at that time contemplated abdication, but the palace which
he would have occupied as ex-Emperor had fallen into such a state of
disrepair as to be virtually uninhabitable. Hideyoshi signalized his
loyalty on this occasion by spending a large sum on the renovation of
the palace, and in recognition of his services the Emperor raised him
to the high post of nai-daijin. It was confidently expected that he
would then become sa-daijin, but, owing to complications which need
not be related here, the outcome of the matter was that he received
the still higher post of kwampaku (regent). There can be no doubt
that he himself had contemplated becoming shogun. In fact, it is on
record that he made proposals in that sense to Yoshiaki, the last of
the Ashikaga shoguns. But it had come by that time to be recognized
that only a scion of the Minamoto family could be eligible for the
post of shogun, and thus Yoshiaki declined Hideyoshi's overtures,
though to accept them would have materially altered the fallen
fortunes of the Ashikaga sept. Hideyoshi ultimately became prime
minister of State (dajo daijiri) and took the family name of
Toyotomi. It is stated, but the evidence is not conclusive, that in
order to reach these high posts, he had to be adopted into the house
of a Fujiwara noble. He had been a Taira when he served under
Nobunaga, and to become a Fujiwara for courtly purposes was not
likely to cause him much compunction.
THE MONKS, SHIKOKU, AND ETCHU
Immediately on the termination of the Komaki War, Hideyoshi took
steps to deal effectually with the three enemies by whom his
movements had been so much hampered, namely, the Buddhist priests of
Kii, the Chosokabe clan in Shikoku, and the Sasa in Etchu. It has
already been stated that the priests of Kii had their headquarters at
Negoro, where there stood the great monastery of Dai-Dembo-In,
belonging to the Shingon sect and enjoying almost the repute of
Koya-san. Scarcely less important was the monastery of Sawaga in the
same province. These two centres of religion had long been in
possession of large bodies of trained soldiers whose ranks were from
time to time swelled by the accession of wandering samurai (ronin).
The army despatched from Osaka in the spring of 1585 to deal with
these warlike monks speedily captured the two monasteries, and, for
purposes of intimidation, crucified a number of the leaders. For a
time, Koya-san itself was in danger, several of the fugitive monks
having taken refuge there. But finally Koya-san was spared in
consideration of surrendering estates yielding twenty-one thousand
koku of rice, which properties had been violently seized by the
monasteries in former years.
Three months later, Hideyoshi turned his arms against the Chosokabe
sept in Shikoku. This being an enterprise of large dimensions, he
entrusted its conduct to five of his most competent generals, namely,
Ukita Hideiye, Hachisuka Iemasa, Kuroda Nagamasa, Kikkawa Motoharu,
and Kohayakawa Takakage. Hideyoshi himself would have assumed the
direct command, and had actually set out for that purpose from Osaka,
when couriers met him with intelligence that less than one month's
fighting had brought the whole of the Island of the Four Provinces
into subjection. He therefore turned eastward, and entering Etchu,
directed the operations, in progress there under the command of Maeda
Toshiiye against Sasa Narimasa. This campaign lasted seven days, and
ended in the surrender of Narimasa, to whom Hideyoshi showed
remarkable clemency, inasmuch as he suffered him to remain in
possession of considerable estates in Etchu.
THE UESUGI
At this time Hideyoshi cemented relations of friendship with the
Uesugi family of Echigo, whose potentialities had always been a
subject of apprehension to Nobunaga. The powerful sept was then ruled
by Kagekatsu, nephew of the celebrated Kenshin.
Pages: | Prev | | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | | 6 | | 7 | | 8 | | 9 | | 10 | | 11 | | 12 | | 13 | | 14 | | 15 | | 16 | | 17 | | 18 | | 19 | | 20 | | 21 | | 22 | | 23 | | 24 | | 25 | | 26 | | 27 | | 28 | | 29 | | 30 | | 31 | | 32 | | 33 | | 34 | | 35 | | 36 | | 37 | | 38 | | 39 | | 40 | | 41 | | 42 | | 43 | | 44 | | 45 | | 46 | | 47 | | 48 | | 49 | | 50 | | 51 | | 52 | | 53 | | 54 | | 55 | | 56 | | 57 | | 58 | | 59 | | 60 | | 61 | | 62 | | 63 | | 64 | | 65 | | 66 | | 67 | | 68 | | 69 | | 70 | | 71 | | 72 | | 73 | | 74 | | 75 | | 76 | | 77 | | 78 | | 79 | | 80 | | 81 | | 82 | | 83 | | 84 | | 85 | | 86 | | 87 | | 88 | | 89 | | 90 | | 91 | | 92 | | 93 | | 94 | | 95 | | 96 | | 97 | | 98 | | 99 | | 100 | | 101 | | 102 | | 103 | | 104 | | 105 | | 106 | | 107 | | 108 | | 109 | | 110 | | 111 | | 112 | | 113 | | 114 | | 115 | | 116 | | 117 | | 118 | | 119 | | 120 | | 121 | | 122 | | 123 | | 124 | | 125 | | 126 | | 127 | | 128 | | 129 | | 130 | | 131 | | 132 | | 133 | | 134 | | 135 | | 136 | | 137 | | 138 | | 139 | | 140 | | 141 | | 142 | | 143 | | 144 | | 145 | | 146 | | 147 | | 148 | | 149 | | 150 | | 151 | | 152 | | 153 | | 154 | | 155 | | 156 | | 157 | | 158 | | 159 | | 160 | | 161 | | 162 | | 163 | | 164 | | 165 | | 166 | | 167 | | 168 | | 169 | | 170 | | 171 | | 172 | | 173 | | 174 | | 175 | | 176 | | 177 | | 178 | | 179 | | 180 | | 181 | | 182 | | 183 | | 184 | | 185 | | 186 | | 187 | | 188 | | 189 | | 190 | | 191 | | 192 | | 193 | | 194 | | 195 | | 196 | | 197 | | 198 | | 199 | | 200 | | 201 | | 202 | | 203 | | 204 | | 205 | | 206 | | 207 | | 208 | | 209 | | 210 | | 211 | | 212 | | 213 | | 214 | | 215 | | 216 | | 217 | | 218 | | 219 | | 220 | | 221 | | 222 | | 223 | | 224 | | 225 | | 226 | | 227 | | 228 | | 229 | | 230 | | 231 | | 232 | | 233 | | 234 | | 235 | | 236 | | 237 | | 238 | | 239 | | 240 | | 241 | | 242 | | 243 | | 244 | | 245 | | 246 | | 247 | | 248 | | 249 | | 250 | | 251 | | 252 | | 253 | | 254 | | 255 | | 256 | | 257 | | 258 | | 259 | | 260 | | 261 | | 262 | | 263 | | 264 | | Next |