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On the southern
bank of the Tadong, the invaders found themselves in a position even
more difficult than that which had confronted them at the Imjin. They
had to pass a wide rapid river with a walled city of great strength
on its northern bank and with all the boats in the possession of the
Korean garrison, which was believed to be very numerous. Some
parleying took place, and the issue of the situation seemed very
doubtful when the Koreans lost patience and crossed the river, hoping
to destroy the Japanese by a night attack. They miscalculated the
time required for this operation, and daylight compelled them to
abandon the enterprise when its only result had been to disclose to
the invaders the whereabouts of the fords. Then ensued a disorderly
retreat on the part of the Koreans, and there being no time for the
latter to fire the town, storehouses full of grain fell into the
hands of the invaders. The Korean Court resumed its flight as far as
Wi-ju, a few miles south of the Yalu River, whence messengers were
sent to China to solicit succour.
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Thus far, everything had marched in perfect accord with the Japanese
programme. A force of nearly two hundred thousand men had been
carried over the sea and had overrun practically the whole of Korea.
"At this point, however, the invasion suffered a check owing to a
cause which in modern times has received much attention, though in
Hideyoshi's days it had been little considered; the Japanese lost the
command of the sea. The Japanese idea of sea fighting in those times
was to use open boats propelled chiefly by oars. They closed as
quickly as possible with the enemy and then fell on with the
trenchant swords which they used so skilfully. Now, during the
fifteenth century and part of the sixteenth, the Chinese had been so
harassed by Japanese piratical raids that their inventive genius,
quickened by suffering, suggested a device for coping with these
formidable adversaries. Once allow the Japanese swordsman to come to
close quarters and he carried all before him. To keep him at a
distance, then, was the great desideratum, and the Chinese compassed
this in maritime warfare by completely covering their boats with
roofs of solid timber, so that those within were protected against
missiles or other weapons, while loop-holes and ports enabled them to
pour bullets and arrows on a foe.
"The Koreans learned this device from the Chinese and were the first
to employ it in actual warfare. Their own history alleges that they
improved upon the Chinese model by nailing sheet iron over the roofs
and sides of the 'turtle-shell' craft and studding the whole surface
with chevaux de frise, but Japanese annals indicate that in the great
majority of cases timber alone was used. It seems strange that the
Japanese should have been without any clear perception of the immense
fighting superiority possessed by such protected war-vessels over
small open boats. But certainly they were either ignorant or
indifferent. The fleet which they provided to hold the command of
Korean waters did not include one vessel of any magnitude; it
consisted simply of some hundreds of row-boats manned by seven
thousand men. Hideyoshi himself was perhaps not without misgivings.
Six years previously, he had endeavoured to obtain two war-galleons
from the Portuguese, and had he succeeded, the history of the Far
East might have been radically different. Evidently, however, he
committed a blunder which his countrymen in modern times have
conspicuously avoided; he drew the sword without having fully
investigated his adversary's resources.
"Just about the time when the van of the Japanese army was entering
Seoul, the Korean admiral, Yi Sun-sin, at the head of a fleet of
eighty vessels, attacked the Japanese squadron which lay at anchor
near the entrance to Fusan harbour, set twenty-six of the vessels on
fire, and dispersed the rest. Four other engagements ensued in rapid
succession. The last and most important took place shortly after the
Japanese troops had seized Pyong-yang. It resulted in the sinking of
over seventy Japanese vessels, transports and fighting ships
combined, which formed the main part of a flotilla carrying
reinforcements by sea to the van of the invading army. This despatch
of troops and supplies by water had been a leading feature of
Hideyoshi's plan of campaign, and the destruction of the flotilla to
which the duty was entrusted may be said to have sealed the fate of
the war by isolating the army in Korea from its home base.
"It is true that Konishi Yukinaga, who commanded the first division,
desired to continue his northward march from Pyong-yang without
delay. He argued that China was wholly unprepared, and that the best
hope of ultimate victory lay in not giving her time to collect her
forces. But the commander-in-chief, Ukita Hideiye, refused to endorse
this plan. He took the view that since the Korean provinces were
still offering desperate resistance, supplies could not be drawn from
them, neither could the troops engaged in subjugating them be freed
for service at the front. Therefore it was essential to await the
consummation of the second phase of Hideyoshi's plan, namely, the
despatch of re-enforcements and munitions by water to Pyong-yang. The
reader has seen how that second phase fared. The Japanese commander
at Pyong-yang never received any accession of strength. His force
suffered constant diminution from casualties, and the question of
commissariat became daily more difficult. . . . Japanese historians
themselves admit the fact that no wise effort was made to conciliate
the Korean people. They were treated so harshly that even the humble
peasant took up arms, and thus the peninsula, instead of serving as a
basis of supplies, had to be garrisoned perpetually by a strong
army."* Korean historians give long and minute accounts of the
development and exploits of guerilla bands, which, though they did
not obtain any signal victory over the invaders, harassed the latter
perpetually, and compelled them to devote a large part of their force
to guarding the lines of communication.
*Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition; article "Japan," by Brinkley.
CHINESE INTERFERENCE
Having suffered for their loyalty to China, the Koreans naturally
looked to her for succour. Peking should have understood the
situation thoroughly. Even without any direct communication from
Japan, the Peking Court had cognizance of Hideyoshi's intentions. A
letter addressed by him in the year 1591 to the King of Ryukyu stated
clearly his intention of extending Japanese sovereignty throughout
the whole Orient, and the ruler of Ryukyu had lost no time in making
this fact known to Peking.* Yet it does not appear that the Chinese
had any just appreciation of the situation. Their first response to
Korea's appeal was to mobilize a force of five thousand men in the
Liaotung peninsula, which force crossed the Yalu and moved against
Pyong-yang, where the Japanese van had been lying idle for over two
months. This occurred early in October, 1592. The incident
illustrated China's confidence in her own superiority. "The whole of
the Korean forces had been driven northward throughout the entire
length of the peninsula by Japanese armies, yet Peking considered
that five thousand Chinese braves would suffice to roll back this
tide of invasion."
*There is still extant a letter addressed by Hideypshi in June, 1592,
to Hidetsugu, his nephew, and then nominal successor. In this
document it is distinctly stated that the attention of the Emperor of
Japan should be directed to the Chinese capital, inasmuch as the
Japanese Court would pay a visit to Peking in 1594, on which occasion
the ten provinces surrounding the Chinese capital would be presented
to his Majesty, and out of this territory the Court nobles would
receive estates.
The result was a foregone conclusion. Three thousand of the Chinese
were killed, and the rest fled pele-mele across the Yalu. China now
began to be seriously alarmed. She despatched to Pyong-yang an envoy
named Chen Weiching--known in Japanese history as Chin Ikei--who was
instructed not to conclude peace but only to make such overtures as
might induce the Japanese to agree to an armistice, thus enabling the
Chinese authorities to mobilize a sufficient force. Konishi Yukinaga
fell into this trap. He agreed to an armistice of fifty days, during
which the Japanese pledged themselves not to advance more than three
miles northward of Pyong-yang while Chen proceeded to Peking to
arrange terms of peace. It is very evident that had the Japanese seen
any certain prospect of proceeding to the invasion of China, they
would not have agreed to such an arrangement as this--an arrangement
which guaranteed nothing except leisure for the mobilization of a
strong Chinese army. It had, indeed, become plain to the Japanese
commanders, after six months of operations in the peninsula, that the
wisest course for them was to arrange a satisfactory peace.
The second force put in the field by China is estimated by the
Jesuits and the Japanese at 200,000 men and at 51,000 by Korean
history. Probably the truth lies midway between the two extremes.
This powerful army moved across Manchuria in the dead of winter and
hurled itself against Pyong-yang during the first week of February,
1593. The Japanese garrison at that place cannot have greatly
exceeded twenty thousand men, for nearly one-half of its original
number had been detached to hold a line of forts guarding the
communications with Seoul. Neither Chinese nor Japanese history
comments on the instructive fact that the arrival of this army under
the walls of Pyong-yang was China's answer to her envoy's promise of
a satisfactory peace, nor does it appear that any discredit attached
to Chen Weiching for the deception he had practised; his competence
as a negotiator was subsequently admitted without cavil. The Chinese,
though their swords were much inferior to the Japanese weapon,
possessed great superiority in field artillery and cavalry, as well
as in the fact that their troopers wore iron mail which defied the
keenest blade.
bank of the Tadong, the invaders found themselves in a position even
more difficult than that which had confronted them at the Imjin. They
had to pass a wide rapid river with a walled city of great strength
on its northern bank and with all the boats in the possession of the
Korean garrison, which was believed to be very numerous. Some
parleying took place, and the issue of the situation seemed very
doubtful when the Koreans lost patience and crossed the river, hoping
to destroy the Japanese by a night attack. They miscalculated the
time required for this operation, and daylight compelled them to
abandon the enterprise when its only result had been to disclose to
the invaders the whereabouts of the fords. Then ensued a disorderly
retreat on the part of the Koreans, and there being no time for the
latter to fire the town, storehouses full of grain fell into the
hands of the invaders. The Korean Court resumed its flight as far as
Wi-ju, a few miles south of the Yalu River, whence messengers were
sent to China to solicit succour.
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Thus far, everything had marched in perfect accord with the Japanese
programme. A force of nearly two hundred thousand men had been
carried over the sea and had overrun practically the whole of Korea.
"At this point, however, the invasion suffered a check owing to a
cause which in modern times has received much attention, though in
Hideyoshi's days it had been little considered; the Japanese lost the
command of the sea. The Japanese idea of sea fighting in those times
was to use open boats propelled chiefly by oars. They closed as
quickly as possible with the enemy and then fell on with the
trenchant swords which they used so skilfully. Now, during the
fifteenth century and part of the sixteenth, the Chinese had been so
harassed by Japanese piratical raids that their inventive genius,
quickened by suffering, suggested a device for coping with these
formidable adversaries. Once allow the Japanese swordsman to come to
close quarters and he carried all before him. To keep him at a
distance, then, was the great desideratum, and the Chinese compassed
this in maritime warfare by completely covering their boats with
roofs of solid timber, so that those within were protected against
missiles or other weapons, while loop-holes and ports enabled them to
pour bullets and arrows on a foe.
"The Koreans learned this device from the Chinese and were the first
to employ it in actual warfare. Their own history alleges that they
improved upon the Chinese model by nailing sheet iron over the roofs
and sides of the 'turtle-shell' craft and studding the whole surface
with chevaux de frise, but Japanese annals indicate that in the great
majority of cases timber alone was used. It seems strange that the
Japanese should have been without any clear perception of the immense
fighting superiority possessed by such protected war-vessels over
small open boats. But certainly they were either ignorant or
indifferent. The fleet which they provided to hold the command of
Korean waters did not include one vessel of any magnitude; it
consisted simply of some hundreds of row-boats manned by seven
thousand men. Hideyoshi himself was perhaps not without misgivings.
Six years previously, he had endeavoured to obtain two war-galleons
from the Portuguese, and had he succeeded, the history of the Far
East might have been radically different. Evidently, however, he
committed a blunder which his countrymen in modern times have
conspicuously avoided; he drew the sword without having fully
investigated his adversary's resources.
"Just about the time when the van of the Japanese army was entering
Seoul, the Korean admiral, Yi Sun-sin, at the head of a fleet of
eighty vessels, attacked the Japanese squadron which lay at anchor
near the entrance to Fusan harbour, set twenty-six of the vessels on
fire, and dispersed the rest. Four other engagements ensued in rapid
succession. The last and most important took place shortly after the
Japanese troops had seized Pyong-yang. It resulted in the sinking of
over seventy Japanese vessels, transports and fighting ships
combined, which formed the main part of a flotilla carrying
reinforcements by sea to the van of the invading army. This despatch
of troops and supplies by water had been a leading feature of
Hideyoshi's plan of campaign, and the destruction of the flotilla to
which the duty was entrusted may be said to have sealed the fate of
the war by isolating the army in Korea from its home base.
"It is true that Konishi Yukinaga, who commanded the first division,
desired to continue his northward march from Pyong-yang without
delay. He argued that China was wholly unprepared, and that the best
hope of ultimate victory lay in not giving her time to collect her
forces. But the commander-in-chief, Ukita Hideiye, refused to endorse
this plan. He took the view that since the Korean provinces were
still offering desperate resistance, supplies could not be drawn from
them, neither could the troops engaged in subjugating them be freed
for service at the front. Therefore it was essential to await the
consummation of the second phase of Hideyoshi's plan, namely, the
despatch of re-enforcements and munitions by water to Pyong-yang. The
reader has seen how that second phase fared. The Japanese commander
at Pyong-yang never received any accession of strength. His force
suffered constant diminution from casualties, and the question of
commissariat became daily more difficult. . . . Japanese historians
themselves admit the fact that no wise effort was made to conciliate
the Korean people. They were treated so harshly that even the humble
peasant took up arms, and thus the peninsula, instead of serving as a
basis of supplies, had to be garrisoned perpetually by a strong
army."* Korean historians give long and minute accounts of the
development and exploits of guerilla bands, which, though they did
not obtain any signal victory over the invaders, harassed the latter
perpetually, and compelled them to devote a large part of their force
to guarding the lines of communication.
*Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition; article "Japan," by Brinkley.
CHINESE INTERFERENCE
Having suffered for their loyalty to China, the Koreans naturally
looked to her for succour. Peking should have understood the
situation thoroughly. Even without any direct communication from
Japan, the Peking Court had cognizance of Hideyoshi's intentions. A
letter addressed by him in the year 1591 to the King of Ryukyu stated
clearly his intention of extending Japanese sovereignty throughout
the whole Orient, and the ruler of Ryukyu had lost no time in making
this fact known to Peking.* Yet it does not appear that the Chinese
had any just appreciation of the situation. Their first response to
Korea's appeal was to mobilize a force of five thousand men in the
Liaotung peninsula, which force crossed the Yalu and moved against
Pyong-yang, where the Japanese van had been lying idle for over two
months. This occurred early in October, 1592. The incident
illustrated China's confidence in her own superiority. "The whole of
the Korean forces had been driven northward throughout the entire
length of the peninsula by Japanese armies, yet Peking considered
that five thousand Chinese braves would suffice to roll back this
tide of invasion."
*There is still extant a letter addressed by Hideypshi in June, 1592,
to Hidetsugu, his nephew, and then nominal successor. In this
document it is distinctly stated that the attention of the Emperor of
Japan should be directed to the Chinese capital, inasmuch as the
Japanese Court would pay a visit to Peking in 1594, on which occasion
the ten provinces surrounding the Chinese capital would be presented
to his Majesty, and out of this territory the Court nobles would
receive estates.
The result was a foregone conclusion. Three thousand of the Chinese
were killed, and the rest fled pele-mele across the Yalu. China now
began to be seriously alarmed. She despatched to Pyong-yang an envoy
named Chen Weiching--known in Japanese history as Chin Ikei--who was
instructed not to conclude peace but only to make such overtures as
might induce the Japanese to agree to an armistice, thus enabling the
Chinese authorities to mobilize a sufficient force. Konishi Yukinaga
fell into this trap. He agreed to an armistice of fifty days, during
which the Japanese pledged themselves not to advance more than three
miles northward of Pyong-yang while Chen proceeded to Peking to
arrange terms of peace. It is very evident that had the Japanese seen
any certain prospect of proceeding to the invasion of China, they
would not have agreed to such an arrangement as this--an arrangement
which guaranteed nothing except leisure for the mobilization of a
strong Chinese army. It had, indeed, become plain to the Japanese
commanders, after six months of operations in the peninsula, that the
wisest course for them was to arrange a satisfactory peace.
The second force put in the field by China is estimated by the
Jesuits and the Japanese at 200,000 men and at 51,000 by Korean
history. Probably the truth lies midway between the two extremes.
This powerful army moved across Manchuria in the dead of winter and
hurled itself against Pyong-yang during the first week of February,
1593. The Japanese garrison at that place cannot have greatly
exceeded twenty thousand men, for nearly one-half of its original
number had been detached to hold a line of forts guarding the
communications with Seoul. Neither Chinese nor Japanese history
comments on the instructive fact that the arrival of this army under
the walls of Pyong-yang was China's answer to her envoy's promise of
a satisfactory peace, nor does it appear that any discredit attached
to Chen Weiching for the deception he had practised; his competence
as a negotiator was subsequently admitted without cavil. The Chinese,
though their swords were much inferior to the Japanese weapon,
possessed great superiority in field artillery and cavalry, as well
as in the fact that their troopers wore iron mail which defied the
keenest blade.
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