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But, as a
matter of fact, in spite of heroic efforts and unlimited bravery on
the Japanese side, Port Arthur, with its garrison of thirty thousand
men, its splendid fortifications, and its powerful artillery, backed
by the indomitable resolution and stubborn resistance of Russian
soldiers, did not fall until the last day of 1904, and Nogi's army
was unable to take part in the great field-battles which marked the
advance of the three other Japanese armies from the seacoast to the
capital of Manchuria.
Step by step, however, though at heavy sacrifice of life, the
Japanese fought their way through the outer lines of the Russian
defences, and the end of July saw the besiegers in such a position
that they were able to mount guns partly commanding the anchorage
within the port. An intolerable situation being thus created for the
Russian squadron, it determined to put to sea, and on August 10th
this was attempted. Without entering into details of the fight that
ensued, it will suffice to state briefly that the result of the
sortie was to deprive the Russian squadron of the services of one
battle-ship, three cruisers, and five torpedo craft, leaving to
Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtonsky, who commanded the vessels in Port
Arthur, only five battle-ships, two cruisers (of which one was
injured), and three destroyers. On August 18th, a gunboat; on August
23d, another battle-ship, and on August 24th another destroyer were
sunk or disabled by striking Japanese mines, and it may be said
briefly that the Russian squadron thenceforth ceased to be a menace
to the Japanese, and that only the land forces had to be counted
with.
FIELD OPERATIONS PRIOR TO BATTLE OF LIAOYANG
By the close of June the three Japanese armies under Generals Kuroki,
Nozu, and Oku were fully deployed and ready to advance in unison. The
task before them was to clear the Russians from the littoral of the
Korean Sea and force them through the mountains of Manchuria into the
valley of the Liao River. In these operations the Japanese acted
uniformly on the offensive, whereas the Russians occupied positions
carefully chosen and strictly fortified, where they stood always on
the defensive. Five heavy engagements, beginning with Fenshuiling on
the 26th of June and ending with Yangtzuling on July 31st, were
fought in these circumstances, and in every instance the Japanese
emerged victorious. From the commencement of the land campaign until
the end of July the invading army's casualties were 12,000, while the
Russian losses, exclusive of those at Port Arthur, aggregated 28,000
killed and wounded, and 113 light siege-and field-guns, together with
eighteen machine-guns, captured.
THE BATTLE OF LIAOYANG
The first great phase of the field-operations may be said to have
terminated with the battle of Liaoyang, which commenced on August
25th and continued almost without interruption for nine days,
terminating on the 3rd of September. In this historic contest the
Russians had 220,000 men engaged. They were deployed over a front of
about forty miles, every part of which had been entrenched and
fortified with the utmost care and ingenuity. In fact, the position
seemed impregnable, and as the Japanese could muster only some
200,000 men for the attack, their chances of success appeared very
small. Desperate fighting ensued, but no sensible impression could be
made on the Russian lines, and finally, as a last resource, a strong
force of Kuroki's army was sent across the Taitsz River to turn the
enemy's left flank. The Russian general, Kuropatkin, rightly
estimated that the troops detached by General Kuroki for this purpose
were not commensurate with the task assigned to them, whereas the
Russians could meet this flanking movement with overwhelming
strength. Therefore, Kuropatkin sent three army corps across the
river, and by September 1st, the Japanese flanking forces were
confronted by a powerful body.
Strategists are agreed that, had Kuropatkin's plans found competent
agents to execute them, the Japanese advance would have been at least
checked at Liaoyang. In fact, the Japanese, in drafting their
original programme, had always expected that Nogi's army would be in
a position on the left flank in the field long before there was any
question of fighting at Liaoyang. It was thus due to the splendid
defence made by the garrison of the great fortress that Kuropatkin
found himself in such a favourable position at the end of August. But
unfortunately for the Russians, one of their generals, Orloff, who
had thirteen battalions under his command, showed incompetence, and
falling into an ambuscade in the course of the counter-flanking
operation, suffered defeat with heavy losses. The Japanese took full
advantage of this error, and Kuropatkin, with perhaps excessive
caution, decided to abandon his counter-movement and withdraw from
Liaoyang. He effected his retreat in a manner that bore testimony to
the excellence of his generalship. The casualties in this great
battle were very heavy. From August 25th, when the preliminary
operations may be said to have commenced, to September 3rd, when the
field remained in the possession of the Japanese, their losses were
17,539, namely, 4866 in the First Army, 4992 in the Fourth, and 7681
in the Second, while the Russian casualties were estimated at 25,000.
BATTLES OF SHAHO AND OF HEIKAUTAI
On the 2nd of October, General Kuropatkin issued from his
headquarters in Mukden an order declaring that the "moment for the
attack, ardently desired by the army, had at last arrived, and that
the Japanese were now to be compelled to do Russia's will." Barely a
month had elapsed since the great battle at Liaoyang, and it still
remains uncertain what had happened in that interval to justify the
issue of such an order. But the most probable explanation is that
Kuropatkin had received re-enforcements, so that he could marshal
250,000 to 260,000 troops for the proposed offensive, and that his
news from Port Arthur suggested the necessity of immediate and
strenuous efforts to relieve the fortress. His plan was to throw
forward his right so as to outflank the Japanese, recover possession
of Liaoyang, and obtain command of the railway.
He set his troops in motion on the 9th of October, but he was driven
back after more than a week's fighting. No less than 13,333 Russian
dead were left on the field, and at the lowest calculation,
Kuropatkin's casualties must have exceeded 60,000 men exclusive of
prisoners. There can be no doubt whatever that the Russian army had
suffered one of the most overwhelming defeats in its history, and
that after a fortnight's hard marching and nine days' hard fighting,
with little food or sleep, it had been reduced by terrible losses and
depressing fatigues to a condition bordering on extermination. Such
was the result of Kuropatkin's first attempt to assume the offensive.
Thereafter, fully three months of complete inaction ensued, and the
onlooking world occupied itself with conjectures as to the
explanation of this apparent loss of time.
Yet the chief reason was very simple. The weather in central
Manchuria at the close of the year is such as to render military
manoeuvres almost impossible on a large scale, and this difficulty is
greatly accentuated by the almost complete absence of roads. In fact,
the reasons which induced Kuropatkin to defy these obstacles, and
renew his outflanking attempts after the beginning of the cold
weather, have never been fully explained. The most probable theory is
that held by Japanese strategists, namely, that he desired to find
some opening for the vigorous campaign which he intended to pursue in
the spring, and that his attention was naturally directed to the
region between the Hun and the Liao rivers, a region unoccupied by
either army and yet within striking distance of the bases of both.
Moreover, he had received nearly three whole divisions from Europe,
and he looked to these fresh troops with much confidence. He set his
forces in motion on the 25th of January, 1905. Seven Russian
divisions were engaged, and the brunt of the fighting was borne by
two Japanese divisions and a brigade of cavalry. Two other divisions
were engaged, but the part they acted in the fight was so subordinate
that it need scarcely be taken into account. The Russians were
finally driven back with a loss of some twenty thousand killed,
wounded, or prisoners. This battle of Heikautai was the last
engagement that took place before the final encounter.
PORT ARTHUR
The relief of Port Arthur had ceased to be an important objective of
Kuropatkin before he planned his Heikautai attack. The great fortress
fell on the last day of 1904. It was not until the middle of May that
the Kinchou isthmus and Dalny came into Japanese hands, nor was the
siege army under General Nogi marshalled until the close of June.
During that interval, General Stossel, who commanded, on the Russian
side, availed himself of all possible means of defence, and the
investing force had to fight for every inch of ground. The attack on
the outlying positions occupied fully a month, and not till the end
of July had the Japanese advanced close enough to attempt a coup de
main. There can be no doubt that they had contemplated success by
that method of procedure, but they met with such a severe repulse,
during August, that they recognized the necessity of recourse to the
comparatively slow arts of the engineer. Thereafter, the story of the
siege followed stereotyped lines except that the colossal nature of
the fortifications entailed unprecedented sacrifice of life on the
besiegers' part. The crucial point of the siege-operations was the
capture of a position called 203-Metre Hill. This took place on
November 30th after several days of the most terrible fighting ever
witnessed, fighting which cost the Japanese ten thousand casualties.
The importance of the hill was that it furnished a post of
observation whence indications could be given to guide the heavy
Japanese artillery in its cannonade of the remaining Russian ships in
the harbour.
Nothing then remained for the Russians except to sink the ships, and
this they did, so that Russia lost a squadron which, all told,
represented an outlay of over thirty millions sterling--$150,000,000.
In a telegram despatched to his own Government on January 1st,
General Stossel said: "Great Sovereign, forgive!
matter of fact, in spite of heroic efforts and unlimited bravery on
the Japanese side, Port Arthur, with its garrison of thirty thousand
men, its splendid fortifications, and its powerful artillery, backed
by the indomitable resolution and stubborn resistance of Russian
soldiers, did not fall until the last day of 1904, and Nogi's army
was unable to take part in the great field-battles which marked the
advance of the three other Japanese armies from the seacoast to the
capital of Manchuria.
Step by step, however, though at heavy sacrifice of life, the
Japanese fought their way through the outer lines of the Russian
defences, and the end of July saw the besiegers in such a position
that they were able to mount guns partly commanding the anchorage
within the port. An intolerable situation being thus created for the
Russian squadron, it determined to put to sea, and on August 10th
this was attempted. Without entering into details of the fight that
ensued, it will suffice to state briefly that the result of the
sortie was to deprive the Russian squadron of the services of one
battle-ship, three cruisers, and five torpedo craft, leaving to
Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtonsky, who commanded the vessels in Port
Arthur, only five battle-ships, two cruisers (of which one was
injured), and three destroyers. On August 18th, a gunboat; on August
23d, another battle-ship, and on August 24th another destroyer were
sunk or disabled by striking Japanese mines, and it may be said
briefly that the Russian squadron thenceforth ceased to be a menace
to the Japanese, and that only the land forces had to be counted
with.
FIELD OPERATIONS PRIOR TO BATTLE OF LIAOYANG
By the close of June the three Japanese armies under Generals Kuroki,
Nozu, and Oku were fully deployed and ready to advance in unison. The
task before them was to clear the Russians from the littoral of the
Korean Sea and force them through the mountains of Manchuria into the
valley of the Liao River. In these operations the Japanese acted
uniformly on the offensive, whereas the Russians occupied positions
carefully chosen and strictly fortified, where they stood always on
the defensive. Five heavy engagements, beginning with Fenshuiling on
the 26th of June and ending with Yangtzuling on July 31st, were
fought in these circumstances, and in every instance the Japanese
emerged victorious. From the commencement of the land campaign until
the end of July the invading army's casualties were 12,000, while the
Russian losses, exclusive of those at Port Arthur, aggregated 28,000
killed and wounded, and 113 light siege-and field-guns, together with
eighteen machine-guns, captured.
THE BATTLE OF LIAOYANG
The first great phase of the field-operations may be said to have
terminated with the battle of Liaoyang, which commenced on August
25th and continued almost without interruption for nine days,
terminating on the 3rd of September. In this historic contest the
Russians had 220,000 men engaged. They were deployed over a front of
about forty miles, every part of which had been entrenched and
fortified with the utmost care and ingenuity. In fact, the position
seemed impregnable, and as the Japanese could muster only some
200,000 men for the attack, their chances of success appeared very
small. Desperate fighting ensued, but no sensible impression could be
made on the Russian lines, and finally, as a last resource, a strong
force of Kuroki's army was sent across the Taitsz River to turn the
enemy's left flank. The Russian general, Kuropatkin, rightly
estimated that the troops detached by General Kuroki for this purpose
were not commensurate with the task assigned to them, whereas the
Russians could meet this flanking movement with overwhelming
strength. Therefore, Kuropatkin sent three army corps across the
river, and by September 1st, the Japanese flanking forces were
confronted by a powerful body.
Strategists are agreed that, had Kuropatkin's plans found competent
agents to execute them, the Japanese advance would have been at least
checked at Liaoyang. In fact, the Japanese, in drafting their
original programme, had always expected that Nogi's army would be in
a position on the left flank in the field long before there was any
question of fighting at Liaoyang. It was thus due to the splendid
defence made by the garrison of the great fortress that Kuropatkin
found himself in such a favourable position at the end of August. But
unfortunately for the Russians, one of their generals, Orloff, who
had thirteen battalions under his command, showed incompetence, and
falling into an ambuscade in the course of the counter-flanking
operation, suffered defeat with heavy losses. The Japanese took full
advantage of this error, and Kuropatkin, with perhaps excessive
caution, decided to abandon his counter-movement and withdraw from
Liaoyang. He effected his retreat in a manner that bore testimony to
the excellence of his generalship. The casualties in this great
battle were very heavy. From August 25th, when the preliminary
operations may be said to have commenced, to September 3rd, when the
field remained in the possession of the Japanese, their losses were
17,539, namely, 4866 in the First Army, 4992 in the Fourth, and 7681
in the Second, while the Russian casualties were estimated at 25,000.
BATTLES OF SHAHO AND OF HEIKAUTAI
On the 2nd of October, General Kuropatkin issued from his
headquarters in Mukden an order declaring that the "moment for the
attack, ardently desired by the army, had at last arrived, and that
the Japanese were now to be compelled to do Russia's will." Barely a
month had elapsed since the great battle at Liaoyang, and it still
remains uncertain what had happened in that interval to justify the
issue of such an order. But the most probable explanation is that
Kuropatkin had received re-enforcements, so that he could marshal
250,000 to 260,000 troops for the proposed offensive, and that his
news from Port Arthur suggested the necessity of immediate and
strenuous efforts to relieve the fortress. His plan was to throw
forward his right so as to outflank the Japanese, recover possession
of Liaoyang, and obtain command of the railway.
He set his troops in motion on the 9th of October, but he was driven
back after more than a week's fighting. No less than 13,333 Russian
dead were left on the field, and at the lowest calculation,
Kuropatkin's casualties must have exceeded 60,000 men exclusive of
prisoners. There can be no doubt whatever that the Russian army had
suffered one of the most overwhelming defeats in its history, and
that after a fortnight's hard marching and nine days' hard fighting,
with little food or sleep, it had been reduced by terrible losses and
depressing fatigues to a condition bordering on extermination. Such
was the result of Kuropatkin's first attempt to assume the offensive.
Thereafter, fully three months of complete inaction ensued, and the
onlooking world occupied itself with conjectures as to the
explanation of this apparent loss of time.
Yet the chief reason was very simple. The weather in central
Manchuria at the close of the year is such as to render military
manoeuvres almost impossible on a large scale, and this difficulty is
greatly accentuated by the almost complete absence of roads. In fact,
the reasons which induced Kuropatkin to defy these obstacles, and
renew his outflanking attempts after the beginning of the cold
weather, have never been fully explained. The most probable theory is
that held by Japanese strategists, namely, that he desired to find
some opening for the vigorous campaign which he intended to pursue in
the spring, and that his attention was naturally directed to the
region between the Hun and the Liao rivers, a region unoccupied by
either army and yet within striking distance of the bases of both.
Moreover, he had received nearly three whole divisions from Europe,
and he looked to these fresh troops with much confidence. He set his
forces in motion on the 25th of January, 1905. Seven Russian
divisions were engaged, and the brunt of the fighting was borne by
two Japanese divisions and a brigade of cavalry. Two other divisions
were engaged, but the part they acted in the fight was so subordinate
that it need scarcely be taken into account. The Russians were
finally driven back with a loss of some twenty thousand killed,
wounded, or prisoners. This battle of Heikautai was the last
engagement that took place before the final encounter.
PORT ARTHUR
The relief of Port Arthur had ceased to be an important objective of
Kuropatkin before he planned his Heikautai attack. The great fortress
fell on the last day of 1904. It was not until the middle of May that
the Kinchou isthmus and Dalny came into Japanese hands, nor was the
siege army under General Nogi marshalled until the close of June.
During that interval, General Stossel, who commanded, on the Russian
side, availed himself of all possible means of defence, and the
investing force had to fight for every inch of ground. The attack on
the outlying positions occupied fully a month, and not till the end
of July had the Japanese advanced close enough to attempt a coup de
main. There can be no doubt that they had contemplated success by
that method of procedure, but they met with such a severe repulse,
during August, that they recognized the necessity of recourse to the
comparatively slow arts of the engineer. Thereafter, the story of the
siege followed stereotyped lines except that the colossal nature of
the fortifications entailed unprecedented sacrifice of life on the
besiegers' part. The crucial point of the siege-operations was the
capture of a position called 203-Metre Hill. This took place on
November 30th after several days of the most terrible fighting ever
witnessed, fighting which cost the Japanese ten thousand casualties.
The importance of the hill was that it furnished a post of
observation whence indications could be given to guide the heavy
Japanese artillery in its cannonade of the remaining Russian ships in
the harbour.
Nothing then remained for the Russians except to sink the ships, and
this they did, so that Russia lost a squadron which, all told,
represented an outlay of over thirty millions sterling--$150,000,000.
In a telegram despatched to his own Government on January 1st,
General Stossel said: "Great Sovereign, forgive!
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